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Essay on the Concept of Art and 
Reality
Zoltán Gyenge
Art shows something of reality as a whole, a reality that exists above or below the directly perceptible 
world. There is a first reality, or empirical reality, which can be mapped and captured through sense 
perception and is characterized by immediacy; and then there is a second or imagined reality that 
unfolds beyond direct empirical and experiential observation. While the animal intellect is attracted to 
the surface, to mere appearances, the human intellect is drawn to what lies beyond the surface. The 
ability to imagine is a condition of human intellect, being characterized, in Schopenhauer’s terms, by a 
power of “seeing in things not what nature has actually formed but what she endeavored to form, yet did 
not bring about” (Schopenhauer, 1969, pp. 186-187). For Schopenhauer, this capacity can be fully 
engaged not by the “ordinary man, that manufactured article of nature” (ibid., p. 187), but by the man of 
genius. In contrast, John Ruskin holds that the power of art consists precisely in allowing us to regain 
what can be called the innocence of the eye, in other words, a kind of childlike perception which remains 
blind to the meaning of perceived things. (Ruskin, 2006, p. 42) This paper seeks a possible answer to the 
question of how art ties us to reality. | Keywords: Philosophy of Art, German Idealism, Iconology, 
Interpretation of Art, ‘Internal Erlebnis’
1. Introduction 
1.1. Direct and imagined reality
His contemporaries and rivals were Timanthes, Androeydes, Eupompus 
and Parrhasius. This last, it is recorded, entered into a competition with 
Zeuxis, who produced a picture of grapes so successfully represented 
that birds flew up to the stage-buildings; whereupon Parrhasius 
himself produced such a realistic picture of a curtain that Zeuxis, proud 
of the verdict of the birds, requested that the curtain should now be 
drawn and the picture displayed; and when he realized his mistake, 
with a modesty that did him honour he yielded up the prize, saying that 
whereas he had deceived birds Parrhasius had deceived him, an artist. It 
is said that Zeuxis also subsequently painted a Child Carrying Grapes, 
and when birds flew to the fruit with the same frankness as before he 
strode up to the picture in anger with it and said, I have painted the 
grapes better than the child, as if I had made a success of that as well, 
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the birds would inevitably have been afraid of it. (Plinius, 1949, 35.36)
This passage is about an illusionistic picture made by Zeuxis, which allures the 
birds because it looks so real. It illustrates the question of depiction as illusion 
of direct reality. The ordinary viewer might expect that visual arts represent 
direct reality, what is more: a more and more accurate copy of reality (it does 
not matter that everything that exists in nature is more ‘realistic’ than the 
content provided by a picture). Yet, according to Gadamer, both nature and art 
appeal to us. 
Naturally the significance of art also depends on the fact that it speaks 
to us, that it confronts man with himself in his morally determined 
existence. But the products of art exist only in order to address us in 
this way – natural objects, however, do not exist to address us in this 
way. This is the significant interest of the naturally beautiful: that it is 
still able to present man with himself in respect to his morally 
determined existence. (Gadamer, 1989, p. 45) 
In works of art, artistic beauty is only there to address what precisely defines 
the function and purpose of the works of art (Hegel calls it exploration or 
unveiling of truth).
Against this we must maintain that art’s vocation is to unveil the truth 
in the form of sensuous artistic configuration, to set forth the 
reconciled opposition just mentioned, and so to have its end and aim in 
itself, in this very setting forth and unveiling.  (Hegel, 1975, p. 55)
But natural beauty is significantly and fundamentally of another order. Natural 
beauty is not art’s vocation, if there is any vocation at all. I am only referring to 
the difference between natural and artistic beauty and to the problems of 
mixing them, and we can think here of Kant’s well-known example of imitating 
a nightingale’s song: 
And yet in this case we probably confuse our participation in the cheerfulness 
of a favorite little animal with the beauty of its song, for when bird song is 
imitated very precisely by a human being (as is sometimes done with the 
nightingale's warble) it strikes our ear as quite tasteless. (Kant, 1987, p. 94)
The significance of the so-called direct reality (nature) is undeniable and 
essential, while the higher level of reality is built upon it. At the same time, 
that direct reality seems to be real is a matter of common sense. External 
experience sees it as true. More precisely, the external experience sees this as 
true and does not know about higher order realities. If you have no direct 
experience of something, if directness is lacking, one may take it does not exist 
at all. Schopenhauer's introductory sentence in The World as Will and 
Representation reads as follows: “the world is my representation” (Die Welt ist 
meine Vorstellung). (Schopenhauer, 1969, p. 3) Which certainly means two 
things: on the one hand, all that appears to me is the world. I see the door, my 
boots, my dog, and much more: the world is thus because it appears so and so 
to me. On the other hand, everything qualifies as a world insofar as it appears 
to me. The first reading is intelligible to everyone: what I see, feel or 
experience truly exists. The second reading says that everything can exist only 
if it exists directly for me. Accordingly, the ‘misconception’ related to the 
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‘objectivity’ of the world can be safely discarded. The objectivity of the world 
means that it perdures even when I do not experience it. On the other hand, 
when I image what the world would be after my death, it is an image of my 
own. The deepest basis of objectivity is faith and certainty (with respect to the 
existence of the world) lays in subjectivity.
Let us remember that everyday thinking mistakenly relies on the material 
reality that appears to the senses. One example is the fact that in 1986, many 
people did not believe that there was radiation caused by the nuclear accident 
because they ‘did not feel’, ‘did not see’ the rays coming. Let us take another 
example of popular thinking: the profound belief in this world is expressed by 
the saying: what I can eat exists. Today’s materialistic based vision of the world 
is based on a most strong faith in matter. If we think it over, we can conclude 
that materialism has become a common religion today. Hegel points to this 
idea when he writes about the appearance (Schein) and deception (Täuschung) 
of this ‘bad and transitory world’:
Art liberates the true content of phenomena from the pure appearance 
and deception of this bad, transitory world, and gives them a higher 
actuality, born of the spirit. (Hegel, 1975, p. 9)
In Hegel’s view, art unveils truth and provides a higher and spiritual reality. 
Appearance (Schein) and phenomenon (Erscheinung) cover more precisely the 
immediacy of what is tangible, of what one experiences, sees, hears, touches, 
or, in one word, perceives. The real, the superior and spiritual reality, so the 
true reality is above it all; and it is not tangible, nor tactile nor perceptible. In 
brief: spiritual reality is the only intelligible reality. And, according to Hegel, it 
is conveyed through art. Ordinary thinking, of course, accepts as real whatever 
is perceptible through the senses. But in Hegel’s view, true reality is a spiritual 
reality which cannot be grasped, tasted or smelled through material senses.
For the materialist, it is difficult to understand what Hegel is hinting at. Nor is 
it surprising. Just like philosophy, art is not a mass sport, not even a social 
entertainment. As Heraclitus warns though, Word (Logos) is true evermore, yet 
men are unable to understand it (DK B1). “This world, which is the same for all, 
no one of gods or men has made. But it always was, is, and will be an ever-
living Fire, with measures of it kindling, and measures going out” (κόσμον 
τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὐτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ 
ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα) (DK B30).
Fire or home stove is not simply fire or flame. It refers instead to the coziness 
of the cosmos, where man is man because he lives near the gods (ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ 
δαίμων) (DK B119). As mythology shows it, man's place (ἦθος) is near the gods 
(δαίμων). 
1.2. Imagined reality
The curtain of Parrhasius is that which is always beyond directness. More 
precisely, it is what comes to us through mediation. That which doesn't seem 
real to us at first sight. Or what seems real at a first glance (the curtain) but 
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acquires its meaning only in context. In other words, what is intangible, not 
palpable, what cannot be tasted; what can only be understood through 
interpretation. The curtain refers to the world of the imagination where direct 
experience cannot be valid, which is precisely the opposite of external 
experience.
Here’s another quote from Hegel: “The beauty of art is beauty born of the spirit 
and born again.” (Hegel, 1973, p. 2) As we have seen, Hegel distinguishes 
between material and spiritual senses, but only between them, whereby the 
material refers to touch, smell and taste, while the spiritual refers to sight and 
hearing. But Hegel is not talking about the possibility of inner experience. He 
speaks of the interior, of course, although not in the sense of emotional 
passions. Passions, although of no interest to Hegel, can play a role, along with 
reason, in the possibility of spiritual processing. 
To be clear: there is the image, with its colors, shapes, forms, etc. (which fall 
within sense reality), but there are also the emotions it arises, or the 
passionate rejection, accompanied by thinking or by spiritual gain in the 
Hegelian sense (imagined reality). The latter is also a step forward, towards his 
“transcendence of the sensuous”, which Hegel himself considered so important 
in his Aesthetics:
Art liberates the true content of phenomena from the pure appearance and 
deception of this bad, transitory world, and gives them a higher actuality, born 
of the spirit. Thus, far from being mere pure appearance, a higher reality and 
truer existence is to be ascribed to the phenomena of art in comparison with 
[those of] ordinary reality. (Hegel, 1975, p. 9)
However, according to Hegel, emotional states like pleasure, disgust, anger; joy 
etc. that might affect the observer don’t play any role in transcending the 
sensuous. 
According to Erwin Panofsky, iconology does something similar. In fact, 
iconology itself is nothing more than iconography brought to the level of 
spiritual perception. It is very similar to Hegel, but at the same there are 
significant differences. Panofsky says that iconography refers to a description 
of a work of art, whereas iconology, to its interpretation. (Panofsky, 1955, p. 26-
54) 
However, I have always felt, perhaps mistakenly, that his theory is very strongly 
tied to historicity and that, while it opens the way for a symbolic and 
allegorical approach of contents, it obscures affective experience or the 
philosophical dialogue we engage with the image, on the image (and of course 
with ourselves). It is as if Hegel, Gadamer, and Panofsky needed to be kneaded 
somehow, added a little Simmel, shaken well and preserved somewhat. Here is 
what I mean by that. The ‘pictorial turn’ (in other words, the increase in the 
role played by the image (Mitchell, 1994, pp. 11-35); “ikonische 
Wendung” (Boehm, 1994, pp. 11-38)) laid emphasis on the iconic cult that 
prevails in our world which states that the pictorial representation reigns 
above everything else. But the classics of this theory are quite uncertain as to 
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when the pictorial turn started. If there really is a visual turnaround, then 
interdisciplinarity is needed, Mitchell says. As if he were 'really' insecure. And 
for good reason. It is enough to just look at children who no longer take cubes 
in their hands, no longer build sandcastles, but use the cubes appearing on a 
tablet and build virtual castles out of them. The presence of the power of the 
ability to handle intelligent devices is undeniable. Nowadays, teaching of 
handwriting is considered by an increasing number of people to be 
meaningless, because one must be able to type, instead of writing. Those who 
defend this point of view forget that cognitive skills are developed by using 
hands (through manual activities). Combined with the activity of the mind, 
manual activity brings cognitive skills to a level where creativity may emerge. 
Seeing the PC or tablet monitor is not looking at a ‘picture’. Of course, there are 
different kinds of pictures. A distinction should be made between simple and 
complex images. Let us see what differentiates them. 
2. The philosophy of images 
2.1. Simple images. 
Bound to the material world, a simple image does not convey any inner content 
that would be moved out of immediacy by intellectual or emotional activity. It 
merely explains and analyses what is otherwise tangible. Such is a priority 
table. Or Heidegger’s signpost (“adjustable red arrow”) in Sein und Zeit. 
(Heidegger, 1996, p. 73) A simple image is to be experienced passively; it does 
not require active perception. Rather, it expects people should follow what 
everyone is used to be following.
This kind of image belongs to the first reality. It is presumably what Belting 
calls “visually appearing” (Belting, 2005, p. 2) and being confused with an 
‘image’. Or, I would say, confusing the simple image with the complex image, 
since the visual that appears should also be called an image. Maybe it is the 
way Belting means it. The simple image depicts direct reality.
2.2. The complex image
On the other hand, the complex image conveys different contents. It is given in 
imagined reality. It is not simply meant to be perceived passively, but calls for 
common thinking, for joint and passionate conversation, as well as for further 
intersubjective thinking. Such is the striking angel in the portico in some 
images of the Annunciation (Angelic Greeting). The complex image goes beyond 
immediacy and tangible materiality. It requires active engagement: to act a 
certain way, to change yourself by emotionally charged thinking, to ask and 
doubt, to be transformed by it into an independent and autonomous individual. 
The image is not just an image: it contains spirit and passion. According to Aby 
Warburg, through a passion formula (Pathosformeln), “an emotionally charged 
visual trope”, images express universality, namely in the traditional appearance 
of memory (Warburg, 2003, pp. 104-5). 
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The complex image may even refer to what Belting calls the “authentic 
image” (‘Das Echte Bild’), where “echt” means both 'authentic' and 'real' or 
'true'). (Belting, 2005, 1. Das echte Bild und die Medienfrage), which he 
associates with the concept of truth. But it just says nothing about what truth 
is. I have dealt in detail elsewhere with the possible interpretation of 'truth' in 
relation to the meaning of 'destiny' on the basis of the myth of Er by Plato. 
(Plato 1970, Book X. The Myth of Er). Belting, on the other hand, says we 
expect the 'authentic image' to return reality as it is. But how to distinguish 
between them? The approach of Nicolaus Cusanus might be more illuminating 
than Belting’s. According to Cusanus, there are two kinds of vision. The first 
refers to individual objects, while the second is the abstract vision (visus 
abstractus), also considered the essential vision (visus essentialis). (Cusanus, 
1985) Essential vision means seeing the essence.
The question still remains: what is reality or what is reality like? What is it like 
for you or me, for the others, given that we see it and appreciate it in so many 
different ways? This problem is addressed in the third part of Gorgias’s 
“famous triple movement” (trilemma) (DK.VII.65.) Gorgias’s first theorem 
states that the world does not exist. The second theorem states that even if 
existence exists, it cannot be known. According to the third theorem, even if it 
can be known, it cannot be communicated because numerous ways of 
understanding take the meaning so far that it can only be returned by the 
concept of ‘misunderstanding’.
Thus, postulating the existence of an authentic image will not yield too many 
results. Belting is right, an authentic image is self-contradictory: as it replaces 
something, we consider it real. See (Belting, 2005, Chapter 1)
Let us just think of Gombrich, who rightly draws attention to the great number 
of people who, from Leonardo to Géricault, have already tried to paint the 
figure of a galloping horse as accurately as possible. Manet portrayed horses 
from the front in The Race at Longchamp (1866), in a completely different way 
than painters used before to paint a galloping horse (Gombrich, 1951, pp. 387-
388). Ernest Meissonier (1815-1891), the most celebrated and highest-paying 
painter of his age and a contemporary painter of Manet, was able to create a 
perfect illusion of a winter landscape at the Grande Maison, by using flour to 
simulate snow. The idea had to be dropped because the flour was attracting 
rats. Neither his money nor his imagination had limits. When he made 
Friedland, 1807 (1861-1875) for his masterpiece, he hired a special team to 
study the galloping horses. (Friedland was one of the Napoleon's greatest 
victory in 1807, when, defeating the Russian army, he enforced peace from Tsar 
Alexander I).
What is truth? What is reality? What is authentic? There is no clear answer to 
that.
According to Erwin Panofsky, everything is connected to everything, and this is 
not always a good thing. It is true for his life. Panofsky as a Jewish descent fled 
the Nazis, Warburg also left Germany even earlier (though not long ago), yet 
the two thinkers represent two different eras of art. The Warburg Library was in 
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Hamburg until Nazi power, then it was evacuated from Hamburg to London. 
The former director of the Warburg Library was Fritz Saxl, who had also been a 
significant inspiration for Panofsky, which can be recognized through his 
works. Panofsky himself emigrated to the States in 1933.
Erwin Panofsky became famous mainly for his development of the ‘iconological 
method’ mentioned several times in his essays. Let’s look at this briefly. There 
are three levels in Panofsky’s theory:
(Panofsky, 1959, p. 14)
The theory starts with a pre-iconographical level, then it deals with 
iconographic analysis, and finally, it reaches an iconological level. To my mind, 
these levels could be divided differently: the third level would be closest to 
what I myself outline. 
My own division into levels of processing of the work of art is based on 
Panofsky’s theory (but I am also drawing on Hegel and Gadamer). 
3. From external experience to inner ‘Erlebnis’
I argue that there are three levels of processing a work of art: 
3.1. External experience → in relation to a simple image that is given in direct 
reality.
3.2. Understanding → moving from a simple image to a complex image in 
imagined reality.
3.3. Inner Erlebnis (experiencing understanding) → a complex image given in 
imagined reality.
3.1. External experience 
The first level, or external experience, can be related to the pre-iconographical 
elements. One sees / hears the work of art, one perceives the form, one has a 
basic understanding of the main actions etc.  But this type of understanding is 
very coarse.  For instance, for an Eskimo who has never heard anything about 
Jesus Christ, Leonardo da Vinci’s Last Supper just represents an evening meal 
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with a feasting group of people. This is also the second level for Panofsky. 
Contrary to Panofsky, I think most museum visitors remain, to this today, at 
this level, but at least they go and see an exhibition, listen to an opera, watch a 
theatre play or a movie etc. 
3.2. Understanding
Understanding comes into play when the recipient confronts the work of art 
with a cultural environment, when he or she interprets historical, artistic, or 
technical contexts. When he or she knows what happens in a work of art or 
what is the message conveyed by a work, and why. The recipient, at this stage, 
can place a given work in time, in a context of style. He or she understands 
meaning, or at least guesses secondary communication, he or she is able to 
interpret, compare, sort, and last but not least: appreciate. Let us go on with 
the example of the Last Supper: knowing the rules of perspective, the museum 
visitor knows what the scene is about, the significance of wine and bread, he or 
she understands the symbolic meaning. The visitor may have heard of Alberti's 
famous book On Painting or possibly about Ficino. Therefore, the visitor is able 
to compare, distinguish and evaluate, thanks to his background knowledge.  He 
or she may be going to opera, be especially passionate about the Wagner’s 
music, know lots of stories about him; he or she may be watching the most 
watched theatres performances or read the most important interpretations of 
them. If they are not professionals, nor art or music historians, they may still 
be eager to know a lot of details regarding a particular period or style to which 
a work belongs. Exhibition organizers, art directors and conductors tend to 
bear in mind this kind of ‘perfect visitor’.
3.3. Internal Erlebnis (experience) 
More precisely: the experience and understanding internalized (Erlebnis). It 
means more than iconology (Panofsky), more than the history of cultural 
phenomena and symbols (Cassirer; Panofsky, 1959, p. 8), but it is nothing more 
than what exists in artistic expertise, it cannot do without it, but it goes beyond 
it. It is an art-philosophical understanding and an internalized experience. 
Notions such as Erlebnis (experience) (Georg Simmel) and understanding 
(Hegel) are important here. With respect to Erlebnis, Gadamer, for instance, 
points out that 
An aesthetic Erlebnis always contains the experience of an infinite 
whole. Precisely because it does not combine with other experiences to 
make one open experiential flow, but immediately represents the 
whole, its significance is infinite. (Gadamer, 1989, p. 61)
What is more, the work itself may be urged to speak (at a hermeneutic level), 
hinting in a peculiar way at self-understanding. (Gadamer, 1989, p. XX) 
However, I think the three notions (Erlebnis, understanding and dialogue) are 
somehow present at the same time. Erlebnis is what a work of art offers, 
whatever that may be. The experience, which helps to understand, to recognize 
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the image while at the same time it carries on, captivates the spectator, and in 
the whole process, it invites to dialogue, offers interpretation, demands 
interpretation, argues, accuses, defends, shifts away, alienates, and then 
attracts. This process is present at the same time in the physical realm and in 
the mental context. It does not leave alone, it constantly engages, then 
suddenly releases, liberates, but only to make us soon feel again the tension 
and the dynamism. This is the task of philosophy of art.
4. Conclusion
A dialogue is needed with and for the work. When this dialogue is initiated, it 
gives rise to interpretation, then to another thought, then perturbs the feelings 
again. And so on. This may go beyond the second level (of understanding) but 
without ignoring it. Every stage can only be left behind if you have already 
reached it. The three levels are built on the top of each other, one does not 
exist or can exist without the other. The third only includes the first two. 
Internal experience (Erlebnis) can only arise if we go beyond external 
experience and understanding. 
To be clear: we first need to look at the picture, listen to the music etc.; then to 
understand the message (at a hermeneutical level), in a specific cultural 
context and enjoy the serenity and or pain expressed by the work of art. Finally, 
this understanding is perceived as experience; the experience (Erlebnis) hidden 
in understanding makes itself felt. Contrary to popular belief, the two are not 
mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing.
More precisely or more intelligibly, there are three stages: the ordinary 
understanding, the interpretation of art history, and philosophy of art. The 
third is often forgotten. However, getting further through these stages is 
getting closer to the work of art itself.
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